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The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the the United States of America (USA) has held
joint exercises to respond to biothreats in the Korean Peninsula since 2011. The
exercise was called Able Response (AR) and it aims to coordinate interministerial
procedures inside Korea and international procedures in requesting the medical
resources urgently between ROK and USA, and among ROK and the United Na-
tions, and nongovernmental organizations. AR13 was a functional exercise with a
scenario that presumed a series of attack by terrorists, dispersing Bacillus
anthracis in Seoul. The participants conducted exercises with action cells and
using point-to-point communication system. It was followed by Senior Leadership
Seminar participated by high-ranking officials in ROK and USA to discuss possible
collaboration in advance. AR and its following actions will fortify collaboration
between ROK and USA and enhance the capability of countermeasures against
biothreats in Korea.1. Introduction
Since 2001’s anthrax bioterrorism in the USA, no
large-scale case has been reported in the world. How-
ever, the possibility of bioterrorism still exists with the
rapid development of technology and rapid change in
international relations. As in Defense Whitepaper in theted under the terms of the C
0) which permits unrestrict
roperly cited.
is paper.
ase Control and PreventionMinistry of National Defense (MND) of the Republic of
Korea (ROK), North Korea’s armed forces are capable
of carrying out 13 kinds of viral and bacterial attacks, so
that the Korean Peninsula is exposed to a higher risk of
bioattack than any other region in the world [1]. A
biothreat in the Korean Peninsula could damage not only
Koreans but also foreigners including the US armyreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
ed non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
Table 1. Summary of Able Response Exercise 2013
Details
Type Functional Exercise and High Ranking Official Seminar
Dates June 19e21, 2013
Venue Korea Institute of Defense Analyses
Hosts (ROK) Ministry of National Defense, Korea Centers Disease Control and Prevention
(USA) Department of Defense, Department of Health and Human Services
Participants 230 participants from ROK and USA (including Australian observers)
(ROK) President Office, Ministry of Security and Public Administration, National Emergency
Management Agency, National Police Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence
Service, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, Ministry of Food and Drug Safety,
Seoul Metropolitan City
(USA) White House, Department of States, US Embassy to Korea, Department of Justice, FBI,
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Scenario Bacillus anthracis dispersed by terrorists
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are used in the bioattack, casualties would be expected
in the US army without direct assault on the camps.
Therefore, it is necessary to construct a system of pre-
paredness to respond collaboratively to the biothreat by
the ROK army, ROK government, and US army in
Korea.
In this regard, the Department of Defense (DOD) in
the USA proposed a joint exercise against biothreat to
ROK government in 2010. The first joint exercise, or
Able Response (AR) Exercise was conducted in May
2011 and it has been held annually since then. AR
supposes biothreats in the Korean Peninsula and con-
siders effective countermeasures by military and gov-
ernment along with civil sectors, and discusses
surveillance of biothreat agents, diagnosis, forensic
medicine, information sharing, operation plan, and pol-
icy making, so that it helps to develop better methods
[2e8].
Participants and high-ranking officials evaluated the
exercise very successful in that it enhances the security
against biothreats not only in Korea but also interna-
tionally. High-ranking officials in both countriesFigure 1. Participants of Abcooperated to solve complicated problems. Related
ministries and agencies including the President Office
participated, so that social issues were dealt with as well
as public issues. No previous exercise on biothreats was
conducted between the two countries, although there
were joint-military exercises between them.2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Summary of exercise
AR 13 was a functional exercise on biothreats held
from June 19, 2013 to June 20, 2013. A senior Lead-
ership Seminar was held on June 21, 2013 to discuss
responses of multiple ministries and agencies and
improvement among high-ranking officials in both
countries. This exercise was cohosted by the MND and
Ministry of Health and Welfare, and their counterparts
in the USA, the DOD, and Department of Health and
Human Services. The exercise directors were the Di-
rector of Center for Infectious Disease Control in Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the
Director of Korea Arms Verification Agency in thele Response 13 Exercise.
Table 2. Goals of Able Response exercise 13
(1) To understand each country’s response procedure
and examine the appropriateness
A Inter-ministerial and international information
sharing and collaboration both inside ROK and
in ROKeUSA
B Collaboration of ROKeUSA in strategic
communication and risk communication
in responding biothreats
(2) To identify effectiveness of interministerial/
international collaboration by examining each
ministry/agency’s in ROK procedure (e.g. SOP,
MOA, MOU, manuals) and ROKeUSA governments,
US Forces Korea, allied countries and nongovernmental
organizations
(3) To examine the collaboration procedures to request
medical resources in responding biothreats among
agencies in ROK and in USA, UN, and
nongovernmental organizations
(4) To identify biosurveillance, sensor, other capabilities
of ROKeUSA and to share information and promote
ROKeUSA joint response
MOA Z Memorandum of Agreements, MOU Z Memorandum of
Understanding, ROK Z Republic of Korea, SOP Z Standard Opera-
tion Procedure, UN Z United Nations, USA Z United States of
America.
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ministries and agencies participated, including the
President’s Office, National Intelligence Service, Na-
tional Police Agency, and National Environmental
Management Agency (Table 1, Figure 1). AR 13’s
scenario was composed of a series of bioattacks in
Seoul, and the ministries and agencies of both countries
collaborated with the others in responding to the
attack [9].
AR 13 aimed to conduct a comprehensive procedure
of crisis response in both countries and find strength and
weakness in information sharing, strategic communica-
tion, biosurveillance, and the plan to transfer materials
urgently to Korea (Table 2) [10e13].
2.2. Design of the exercise
This exercise was conducted for 12 hours from June
19, 2013 to June 20, 2013. However, the scenarioPlanning/Training
C
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Figure 2. Able Response Exercise 13 functional exercise.presumed 15 days and ROKeUSA participating
agencies’ opinions are considered in Master Scenario
Events List (MSEL), which was distributed on the exer-
cise site. Participants responded to MSEL with their own
response plans. Scenario and individual event were used
as tools for exercise evaluation and problem shooting.
AR 11 and AR 12 were tabletop exercises, in which
facilitators proposed problems and participants solved
those through discussion. Topics were presented under
virtual scenarios and participants were divided into
several groups and identified their roles and re-
sponsibilities and conducted their responses. AR 13
was a functional exercise to be more realistic
(Figure 2). This aimed to exercise and evaluate by
function and role. For example, to exercise the infor-
mation sharing, each ministry and agency shared in-
formation and evaluated strengths and weakness of the
procedures [14].
Because this type of exercise was introduced for the
first time in AR13, it might have appeared complicated
to the participants and facilitators, so each participant’s
role was specified by designating them into one of
Player Cell, Control Cell, Evaluation Cell, Simulator
Cell, Administration, and Logistic Cell. Players con-
ducted their own agencies’ roles and responded. Control
controlled the exercise and distributed the scenario and
messages. Evaluation evaluated each agency’s response
and recorded. Simulator conducted the role of nonpar-
ticipating agency’s role and Logistic supported materials
and logistics (Figure 3).
The venue was Korea Institute of Defense Analyses
(KIDA), but the participants were presumed to be in their
own agencies. Two buildings in KIDA held three parties,
or exercise control units, ROK participants, USA partic-
ipants, and they were connected by intranet system
enabling point-to-point communication (Figure 4).
2.3. Scenario
The pathogens used in AR 11 were anthrax and hem-
orrhagic fever with renal syndrome virus and tularemia
virus in AR 12 [11]. In AR 13, two terrorist attacks with
Bacillus anthracis were simulated (Figures 5 and 6).
The first attack (Phase 1) was identified by reports of
suspected cases from a university hospital and an army
hospital in Seoul. Epidemiological investigation
revealed a common factor in that the cases had lodged in
Hotel A in Seoul, in particular, all the military officers
who had participated in a ROK-US Defense Sympo-
sium. After identification of Bacillus anthracis from the
specimens of suspected cases, the investigation was
proceeding when the second attack occurred.
The second attack (Phase 2) was reported by a resi-
dent witnessing dispersion of suspicious white powder
from the top of a high-story building by a few men. A
biosurveillance vehicle and Joint Portal Shield (JPS) in
US Forces Korea identified abnormal signs and a
response team was dispatched to the site.
Figure 3. Able Response Exercise 13 organization structure
Figure 4. Response teams in Able Response Exercise 13.
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an 8-day interval causing 2700 patients and 1730 casu-
alties including ROK & US soldiers and citizens, and
foreigners. This scenario focused on ROKeUSA
collaborated risk communication to the general public,
information sharing, and support requesting procedures
[12,15].
The situation came to a severe national disaster
(Phase 3) and a part of Seoul Metropolitan city was
isolated and decontamination was conducted for moreFigure 5. Scenario by phase. AtkZ attack; JPSZ Joint Portal Sh
of Korea; USFK Z Untied States Forces Korea.than 6 months. This brought up a burden in national
resources and the city was stumbled, so that related
ministries and agencies came to discuss not only public
health matters but also general social issues.
3. Results
The results were proposed by the participants and
were presented in the Senior Leadership Seminar on the
last day of the exercise (Figure 7).ield; MNDZMinistry of National Defense; ROKZ Republic
Figure 6. Able Response Exercise 13 attack scenario map.
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Firstly, ROK and USA preparedness to biothreat was
considerably improved since the first AR (May 2011),
especially in terms of development of communication
channels. Both countries discussed what procedures are
necessary to root this partnership. Related agencies
mutually visited and both CDCs andMND (DOD) tried to
conduct joint research and development such as vacci-
nation development. Themeetings to prepare the exercise
led to several more meetings and information sharing,
which in turn fortified mutual collaboration between the
two countries.
Secondly, participants evaluated the exercise ele-
ments and progress as realistic and the scenario gave
deep consideration of biothreats in the Korean Penin-
sula. This exercise drew an important opinion that
participating countries should develop strategic mes-
sages together prior to the real situation, and publish inFigure 7. Senior Lean appropriate time to the general public. Furthermore,
new procedures and methods were searched for to give
the right messages at the right time to the general public.
Thirdly, this exercise provided an opportunity to ex-
ercise each country’s biosurveillance capability and
consider a necessity of a biosurveillance portal. It is a
comprehensive surveillance portal to collect not only
medical but also environmental surveillance data and to
detect natural or artificial bioaccidents as soon as possible.
ROK MND and USA DOD plan to have a good collabo-
ration for a project on a new ROKeUSA biosurveillance
portal.
3.2. Lessons learned
Not all the agencies in the biothreat manual were
involved or participated in the exercise, so that
maximum output of AR 13 could not be drawn. KCDC
and MND actively led the exercise, but in reality, theadership Seminar.
290 S.S. Kim, et altwo are not representative of the Korean government.
Therefore, other related agencies should participate on
the next exercise.
In the biothreat manual, some related agencies were
missing and needed to be added in the revisedmanual [10].
Which ministry took charge of the situation and setup the
control tower depending on the characteristic of attack (a
biothreat or an infectious disease disaster) as different
manuals and reporting systems were applied. For example,
if numbers of acute respiratory syndrome patients were
sharply increased, the bioterror response manual was
applied if it was biothreat, whereas for infectious diseases
causing pandemics such as influenza A (H1N1), the in-
fectious disease response manual was applied.
There has been some achievement in coping with a
biothreat, but more concrete international collaboration
is necessary between ROK and USA. AR is a large-scale
exercise, so it needs to find a method to draw more
related agencies in both countries and to prepare the
exercise all the year round.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
AR13 has considerably grown from AR 11 and
become a model of international exercise on biothreat.
This is an excellent example of interministerial, inter-
agency cooperation.
Individual capability is improved through this exercise
and AR has enhanced the comprehensive national coun-
termeasure on biothreats. Furthermore, it has promoted
international collaboration.AR13 confirms the continuous
improvement in both countries since AR 11. In particular,
Australia observed the exercise and this gives a possibility
to a multiparty joint exercise. The collaboration between
participating agencies becomes concrete. For example,
KCDC has almost joined US CDC’s Laboratory Response
Network and will get a more updated diagnosis protocol.
In conclusion, AR and its following actions will fortify
collaboration between ROK and USA and enhance the
capability to countermeasure biothreat in Korea.References
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